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Using transferable water permits has been identified by economists as a necessary 
tool to efficiently allocate water to its highest valued use. Australian governments 
have seized the concept and begun to provide mechanisms that separate rights to 
water from land ownership and allow flexibility to trade the rights. Water trading is 
slowly taking shape but has been challenged regarding ownership rights and 
technical applications. Several key studies and projects are now testing a similar 
process to be used to develop ownership and incentives for diffuse water pollution. 
This paper analyses how rights to water quantity and water quality are emerging, the 
policy tools being used, and current challenges for decision makers. 
 





Water is vital for everybody – our cities, our farmers, our industries, our nation. We 
can’t live without it. Australian rainfall is the most variable in the world and water is 
supplied differently for everyone. Most residences simply need to pay rates and turn 
on a tap. Farmers may need to source a permit or water allocation in a tenuous, thin 
water market. With most available water in populated regions now allocated, and 
many regions being over allocated, there is a significant body of legal, economic and 
environmental evidence showing increasing and competing demands may cause 
serious conflicts over water allocation and management in the future.  
 
The use of tradeable permit systems has become fundamental to the allocation of 
water. Better defining permits to water as a property right has taken a number of 
evolutionary steps over the past few decades by economists who have convinced law 
makers and water users of the worthwhile contribution tradeable property rights can 
make. The following paper discusses the emergence of water rights in Australia 
(mostly citing policy development and issues in New South Wales and Queensland) 
and that having absent pollution rights, especially with diffuse water pollution 
sources, is mounting a serious threat to the economic and environmental value of 
water. The paper concludes that this problem can be improved by creating a system 
of better defined water property rights, by instigating diffuse water pollution rights, and having access to a range of financial tools to support firms and individuals and 
the validity of the market system for these purposes.  
 
Thirteen years ago Pigram
1 noted that water policy and institutional arrangements 
and the separation of water quantity and quality objectives were not yet prepared for 
the adoption of a sophisticated and Pareto optimal market-oriented property rights 
system; a system where no one is made worse off by decisions relating to water still 
does not exist but policy and institutional arrangements to address these Pareto 
inefficiencies with water has improved significantly since 2000. Poorly defining 
rights to property can pose as a major threat to sustainable management of that 
property and while Australian governments attempt to redress this problem with 
water supply, major constraints exist to social and environmental water policy 
development as water scarcity increases scarcity costs, management costs and 
externality costs. Large gaps remain between the physical and chemical connections 
of water quantity and water quality objectives that are unmatched by policy linkages 
presenting an obvious platform for policy makers in the future.  
 




There is a dearth of information on pre-European Aboriginal use and management of 
water. Of the voluminous literature on Aboriginal land rights, the mention of water 
rights is virtually absent.
2  Certain customs and law are apparent. Aboriginal law is a 
law linked to the biophysical environment, it is often  spiritual and represented 
through what Aboriginal people call ‘dreaming stories’.
3  Aboriginals still to this day 
use totemic species management as a way to monitor and manage their natural 
surroundings. Each person borne is given a totemic species, including water species,  
to monitor and conserve for the remainder of their lives. Aboriginal people also used 
highly exclusive rights over important water holes and rivers.  
 
Discrimination between indigenous and non-indigenous water use has been identified 
in several ways over the last 200 years. Smith comments that certain conflicts around 
the 1800s, especially in the drier areas, Aboriginals were repeatedly driven away 
from the river frontages and lagoons. Many modern day examples see Aboriginal 
communities using dilapidated water holes exhausted by extensive land use and 
contamination by mining and urban development.
4 Smith also speculates whether 
Aboriginal water rights may indeed go down a similar path to land rights where 
pastoral leases and native title have been found to coexist.
5  
 
                                                 
1 Pigram J, “Property Rights and Water Markets in Australia: An Evolutionary Process Toward 
Institutional Reform”, April 1993, Water Resources Research, Vol 29, No 4, 1313-1319. 
2 Smith D, Water in Australia, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1998 at 139. 
3 See Brown A, Keeping the Land Alive: Aboriginal People and Wilderness Protection in Australia, 
Wilderness Society and Environmental Defenders Office, Sydney 1992. 
4 Federal Race Discrimination Commissioner, Water: A report on the provision of water and 
sanitation in remote Aboriginal and Torres Straight Islander Communities, 1994. 
5 See Wik Peoples V The State of Queensland and Ors (1996) 41 ALR 129. Common Law Recognition Of Water Rights 
 
In England in the early nineteenth century owners were largely free to do what they 
liked with their land.
6 It could be said this longstanding liberty influenced a fairly 
relaxed platform of environmental and societal standards; now more commonly 
referred to as ‘duty of care’ – a standard many government agencies are keen to 
improve. Common law comes under pressure to solve resource scarcity problems but 
has issues where law can easily recognise possession and ownership as superior, but 
struggles to recognise moving mediums such as air, water and biodiversity. In time 
this has proved inadequate to deal with the interconnectedness of life and unable to 
deal with common property resource disputes such as water.
7 This traditional view 
has eventually become no longer applicable to land and water management in 
Australia. Many environmental or resource protection schemes posses a duty of care 
or minimum standard where participants must meet certain standards before they can 
participate in the scheme. The duty of care may reflect a performance level better 
than required under legislation or government requirements, but reflects community 
expectations for environmental stewardship.  
 
Prior to the twentieth century, upper catchment rights were such that flow 
downstream could not be diverted and if a large quantity of water was taken the 
owner had to return the quantity with the quality undiminished (concerning 
commercial and extraordinary uses such as irrigation and brewery industries). Before 
1900 “[t]here were well-founded concerns that efforts at water supply and irrigation 
would be undermined by common law claims”.
8 These concerns saw law passed 
moving control of water to the Crown to reinforce the common law view that has 
always held that the Crown’s interest is paramount.
9 When industry greatly expanded 
after the Industrial Revolution common law was affected by the need to better define 
riparian rights such as the Water Act 1912 in NSW aiding judicial interpretation. In 
summary, the common law principle of riparian rights moved to a statutory 
framework. The State owns the water and it is allocated via administrative 
apportionment. Commercial and extraordinary uses are now regulated through water 
licences or permits.  
 
Several cases have been instrumental in shaping this understanding of the “right” to 
water. They also illustrate how interpretation of those rights can change.  
 
Thorpes Ltd v Grant Pastoral Company Pty Ltd 
10 further established the superior 
rights of the Crown however Justice Fullagar cast doubt on earlier judgements of the 
ascendancy of Crown rights
11 and concluded they coexisted alongside riparian rights. 
He argued that: 
 
                                                 
6 Ramsay R and Rowe G, Environmental Law and Policy in Australia, Butterworths, Sydney, 1995, at 
123.  
7 Ibid. 
8 Tan P-L, The 1
st Australasian Natural Resources Law and Policy Conference (Focus on Water), 27-
28 March 2000, at 75. 
9 Boer B and James D (eds), Property Rights and Environment Protection, Environment Institute of 
Australia Inc, 1990. 
10 Thorpes Ltd v Grant Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (1955) 92 CLR 317. 
11 See Hanson v Grassy Gully Gold Mining Co (1900) 21 LR (NSW) 271. “The view which I am disposed to take is that the Act does not directly affect any 
private right but gives the Crown new rights – not riparian rights – which are 
superior to, and may be exercised in derogation of, private riparian rights, but that, 




Van Son v Forestry Commission of NSW
13, a dispute between a riparian water user 
and upstream forestry entity degrading the water (discussed in more detail below 
regarding water quality) showed the relationship between common law riparian 
doctrine and statute riparian rights. This case further established the rights of a 
riparian owner against the Water Act 1912 and Water Administration Act 1986. The 
case submitted that Thorpes’ case should be followed and riparian rights do exist and 
can have serious connotations in relation to water laws.  
 
A Federal Court decision in a bankruptcy matter in 1996, Roy F Griffith v Civil 
Aviation Authority,
14 illustrates that courts tend to consider two principles concerning 
a blur between licences and rights: 
  the context and legislation 
  whether the licence is freely assignable.
15  
 
Judgements have been based on transferability, for example taxi licences and liquor 
licences which are considered property, while grocers’ licences and commercial 
pilots’ licences are not property. Providing there are no limits to transferability (time, 
auction, land etc) it can be presumed “[i]n the face of such limited transferability, [as 




Water legislation and policy recently introduced in NSW and Queensland, and  
discussed further below, has significantly transformed this situation and there now 
exists a statutory, transferable right to water. It remains to be seen whether common 
law remedies can be increasingly marginalised by better law and policy making, or, 
there is the possibility disputes will emerge over allocation and also quality of water 
and the courts may need to play a more significant role in water management. 
Government departments have been active in the education role holding workshops 
and providing information regarding legal implications concerning taxes, wills and 
mortgages. There have been some disputes during the selling of land where water has 
not been properly specified but these disputes have not yet made the courts.
17 Other 
communities are concerned about the impacts of water trading to their communities 
such as those cited on the Murray River where high prices tempt farmers to sell water 
rights and leave the community. Professor Mike Young comments that such property 
owners, or more correctly, water owners, are able to exit the farming industry with 
dignity, that they have enough money to go and do something else, often in the same 
                                                 
12 Thorpes Ltd v Grant Pastoral Company Pty Ltd (1955) 92 CLR 317. 
13 Van Son v Forestry Commission of NSW (1995) 86 LGERA 108. 
14 (1996) 41 ALD 50.  
15 Tan Poh-Ling, “Water licences and property rights: the legal principles for compensation in 
Queensland”, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, August 1999, Vol 16 No 4, at 285. 
16 ibid. 
17 Personal communications, Department of Natural Resources, Mines and Water, August 2006.  district, sometimes elsewhere, and that this is a part of the ongoing structural 
adjustment processes for rural Australia.
18   
 
The Current Era 
 
Most jurisdictions in Australia allocate water by an intricate entitlement system of 
water allocation rights, or certain riparian and farm dam rights. Embargoes on the 
issuing of new water allocations has been introduced in many regions across 
Australia attempting to curb a chronic over-allocation of water rights. New users can 
only gain access to this water through the purchase or leasing of entitlements from 
existing users. Markets to trade water where it can be bought or leased to expand 
operations or sold when not needed is possible where it has been separated from the 
land title.  
 
The following discusses the clarity of the property rights regime, necessary 
ingredients for property rights, law and policy tools used to establish tradeable permit 
schemes and challenges at the common law level. Several distinct phases of water 
property rights have emerged through time: from non-existence, to a common law 
propriety right and to a fully-unbundled, well specified, secure, Torrens based, but 
restricted statute based, water entitlement. There is ongoing pressure from resource 
economists
19 to proceed to full transferable water rights in a tradeable market and, 
while Australian jurisdictions appear to be moving towards a system of property 
rights within a heavily regulated framework, many challenges and constraints exist 
affecting decision making. The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) suggests this is common around the world and water use is 
less amenable to tradeable systems due to: 
  Higher transaction / transportation costs 
  Limits on direction of trade (ie downstream) 
  Limits on market size (often restricted to one water body or catchment), and 
  Increased importance of time and place of use or concentration of emissions.  
 
Also of concern for governments is compensation for future attenuation of rights in 
pursuit of other societal or environmental objectives which could be a barrier to the 
adoption of a strongly non-attenuated property rights structure (for example, more 
water for the environment or communities that have been highly impacted from a 
loss of water rights and therefore flow on business). The situation is certainly 
challenging but many authoritative bodies pursuing water market mechanisms are 
proceeding with confidence in the structures they design and early results are 
encouraging them to progress further down this path.  
 
                                                 
18 Australian Broadcasting Corporation, TV program transcription: 
http://www.abc.net.au/7.30/content/2006/s1744867.htm  Broadcast: 19/09/2006 High prices tempt 
farmers to sell water rights  
19 See Productivity Commission, Rural Water Use and the Environment: The Role of Market 
Mechanisms, Discussion Draft, Melbourne, June 2006 Is the right to use water a property right? 
 
“Concepts of property and property rights are not fixed and immutable, but can 
change form one society to another, one political ideology to another and one time 
period to another.”
20 Over time ownership rights to intangible things such as forests, 
biodiversity and water has seen many different hues such as a Kings Forest in the 
United Kingdom, trout steams in medieval Europe and water law today.  
 
Generally, current water management structures treat water resources in the same 
way as a true public good which can be used to express the rights of individuals not 
to be excluded from natural amenities such as water, air, natural beauty, peace and 
cultural heritage. However, exclusive rights also exist where water law has evolved 
in Australia to an extent such that certain elements of this public good commonality 
have been made exclusive and only obtained by private, commercial arrangements. 
This array of ownership and rights is not without ambiguity or inefficiencies: the 
environment is not getting the water it needs in many water basins and some 
commentators would like to see more substantive moves by governments under 
scarce conditions where water that is now being defined as a secure, excludable 
compensatable right similar to land ownership where, generally, compulsory 
government acquisition receives appropriate compensation. Or, governments can 
participate in constructive water rights buyouts in dry and environmentally impacted 
basins. Economists have critiqued this outcome identifying a number of impediments 
to water trade that are reducing efficiency and should be removed. These include: 
allowing other participants to trade in water markets; opening trading between 
districts, removing harmful pricing schemes, and improving the transparency of rules 
and approval processes.  
 
Market-based property rights systems – which embodies exclusive and tradeable 
entitlements – are being used in the management of a range of natural resources such 
as fisheries, forests, wildlife, and water and also in the control of environmental 
externalities such as pollution. It is argued that well-defined and transferable 
property rights provides an incentive for individuals and firms to use resources as 
efficiently as possible while minimising government intervention. The framework, 
based on neoclassical economic principles, involves setting a quota, essentially a rule 
that only a certain quantity can be taken or used; making the quota tradeable thereby 
shifting the centre of control for allocation, price setting and decision making to the 
firm or individual (or other units such as public utilities) and away from a governed 
‘command and control regime’. If the system works well, a greater sense of 
ownership of resource management by industry members is achieved and 
maintenance of the resource occurs.  
 
A major attraction is that ecological objectives can be achieved but also that difficult 
resource allocations are transferred to the market place and not the government 
picking winners and losers which can be highly inefficient and inequitable. Provided 
exclusion and enforcement of resource rights is possible, markets and prices emerge 
from collective economic behaviour with a certain frequency of trades and healthy 
                                                 
20 Boer B, in Boer B and James D (eds), Property Rights and Environment Protection, Environment 
Institute of Australia Inc, 1990 at 43. number of buyers and sellers.
21 It is envisaged that these protected or sanctioned 
rights will then provide incentive and restraints to use the resource well, to encourage 
use that will benefit the community as well as the individual. Furthermore, rights to 
transfer these entitlements will encourage the resource to be used by higher valued 
uses. That is, if rights to draw water from a river are saleable, they will be bought by 
those who can extract the greatest productive value from the water and sold by those 
who tend to gain more from sale.  
 
Essential Features for Water Property Rights 
 
A property right, as a right of ownership can be described as encompassing three 
main rights: the right to use the asset, the right to returns from the asset, and the 
rights to change the asset’s form, substance and location.
22 The actual origin of water 
property rights depends on the hydrological cycle and its powers of supply. As long 
as there is no shortage, water users are happy to leave it to nature. However, as 
shortages and demand for water both increase, so do calls for clarified rights and the 
ability to transfer those rights for economic gain.
23  
 
Ring fencing property or creating exclusivity is fundamental to establishing a rights 
based system used to avoid overuse and mismanagement of the property in question. 
A definition of property rights that is often used is one put forward by a  High Court 
Decision in 1937 based on the principle of exclusion: 
 
“The primordial principle which emerges from the majority of judgements…is that 
a resource can be propertised if it is – to use anther ugly but effective word – 
“excludable”. A resource is “excludable” only if it is feasible for a legal person to 
exercise regulatory control over the access of strangers to the various benefits 
inherent in the resource.”
24  
 
In the 1990s several texts, such as Sturgess and Wright, discussed a possible water 
property rights regime based on a number of levels – from temporary volume 
transfers to the highly sophisticated level of arbitrage and ‘water futures’. To begin 
movement through the levels of sophistication a number of key requirements are 
needed such as: exclusivity, transferability, law enforcement, tenure and clearly 
defined  rights for the entire system – from environmental rights to the actions of 
third parties.  
 
Government relations and regulatory foundations 
 
Robust regulatory frameworks are necessary for market-based approaches being used 
to manage natural resources even though much of the activity under the regulatory 
                                                 
21 Pearce D and Turner R.K, Economics of Natural Resources and the Environment, Sydney, 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1990 at 17. 
22 Kemper K E, The Role of institutional arrangements for more efficient water resources use and 
allocation, Water Science and Technology, 43(4), 111-117 cited in Etchells T et al, Overcoming third 
party effects from water trading in the Murray-Darling Basin, Water Policy 8 (2006) 69-80.  
23 Sturgess G and Wright M, NSW Cabinet Office, “NSW Rural Water Supply: A case study in the 
evolution of a property rights system in natural resources,” Second Ministerial Water Reform, Forum 
held on behalf of the Hon Ian Causley, Minister for Natural Resources, 17-18 July 1990 at 5.  
24 Kevin Gray ‘Property in This Air (1991) 50 Cambridge Law Journal 252 discussing Victoria Park 
Racing and Recreation Grounds Company Ltd v Taylor and others (1937) 58 CLR 479. instrument will be voluntary or flexible. This point is often misunderstood and the 
more successful market-based instruments implemented in Australia and other 
destinations have done so on the back of robust regulatory support. Market 
instruments can be used in conjunction with other policy tools and have often been 
built on regulatory platforms already established. In addition, more than one market 
instrument can be used to tackle the same environmental issue. This is very much the 
case with water where water pricing (pricing to cover administrative and 
management costs, scarcity costs and externalities) is used in conjunction with water 
trading.  
 
Water resource management in Australia is constitutionally assigned to state 
governments. However, the impetus for water reform in the last decade has come 
from the Commonwealth.
25 The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) water 
reform in 1994 has been the fundamental stimulus of reform and the emergence of 
the property rights issue. In 1994, COAG adopted a strategic framework for 
reforming the management and use of water in Australia. Point 4 of the COAG 
Communique stated that governments would implement systems of allocations or 
entitlements backed by the separation of water property rights from land title and 
clear specification of entitlements in terms of ownership, volume, reliability, 
transferability and if appropriate, quality. The federal government were to make a 
series of payments totalling $4.2 billion to the states and territories over the period 
from 1997 to 2006. These payments are conditional on reforms to a number of 
industries, including the water industry.  
 
In 2000 NSW and Queensland finally started passing laws separating rights to water 
from land. These laws instituted a statutory, transferable right to water and enshrines 
for the first time the need for human and natural processes. Through the Water Act 
2000 (Qld) and water resource plans, and the Water Management Act 2000 (NSW) 
and Management Plans, governments are aiming to strike the correct balance 
between water users, future generations and the environment.  
 
Establishing market mechanisms for water is not simple and is likely to take some 
time to emerge to their full potential. Comprehensive institutional frameworks have 
been put in place ushering in new environmental market and ecosystem service 
concepts where only six years ago the concept of a water property right was 
described as mythical and analogous to the Australian legend on ‘Bunyips’
26 – we 
have all heard of one but never seen one. Water property rights has since been better 
defined by these laws but the work has some way to go especially with 
environmental rights which remain inadequate in volume, temporal, spatial, quality 
and quantity terms especially in certain catchments such as the heavily impacted 
Murray-Darling River where more substantive undertakings are required.  
 
                                                 
25 Tan Poh-Ling, “Water licences and property rights: the legal principles for compensation in 
Queensland”, Environmental and Planning Law Journal, August 1999, Vol 16 No 4, at 284. 
26 See, Blumer M, “In Search of the Common Bunyip: a commonsense approach to water property 
rights in NSW,” The 1
st Australasian Natural Resources Law and Policy Conference (Focus on 
Water), 27-28 March 2000.  Trade in Water 
 
Using markets as a means of allocating natural resources stems largely from the 
assumption that a market will approximate the competitive ideal – finding 
appropriate prices and quantities for a scarce resource. A variety of tradeable water 
systems have emerged around the world, built on the standard property right criteria 
discussed above – scarcity, exclusivity, compensatable right, regulatory backing. The 
fundamental policy task is that water entitlements are assigned a legal property 
status, vested in the individual and negotiable independently of the land. It is hoped 
this legal alteration can accomplish a wide range of environmental, social, and 
economic objectives in a cost-effective manner. Whether these objectives are met or 
not depends, amongst other things, on the design of the market and the ability for 
government policy to supplant identified market failure. Prior to 2000, many 
commentators believed water markets suffered from considerable social pressures 
and political expediency constraining the full operation of water markets.
27 The 
move to a market-based water allocation system in Australia has been slow and 
immersed in political and practical problems because of the difficulty in defining 
property rights.
28 Careful, community based planning stemming from natural 
resource groups is now more the norm relying on a comprehensive range of technical 
detail supplied from various quarters including government agencies, interest groups, 
community groups, industry and universities.  
 
NSW (Water Act 1912; Water Management Act 2000) and Queensland (Water Act 
2000) provide for example a system of tradeable resource rights in water (other states 
and territories have also instituted property rights but have not be reviewed for this 
paper) and these Acts are designed to advance sustainable management of water 
using relevant planning instruments such as Water Resource Plans in Queensland. 
Under the Act, such plans are envisaged to set ‘environmental flow objectives’ for 
the protection of the health of natural ecosystems for the achievement of ecological 
outcomes. A second planning system, Resource Operations Plans establish tradeable 
water entitlements. NSW uses one plan called Land and Water Management Plans. 
Such rules include for example how often rice planting can take place, has references 
to water quality and to formal environmental reviews under certain circumstances.  
 
The granting of new water entitlements in Queensland consists of various  
applications under the Water Act:  
                                                 
27 See Pigram J, Water Resources Research, Vol 29, No 4, April 1993.  
28 Brennan D and Scoccimarro M, “Issues in defining property rights to improve Australian water 
markets”, 1999, The Australian Journal of Agriculture and Resource Economics, 43:1, at 69. 
  Stock and domestic use 
  Downstream locations 
  Mining tenure 
  Local governments and the 
State 
  Previous licences 
  Other applications for or about 
a water licence 
  Cultural uses by Aboriginal or 
Torres Strait Islanders, and 
  natural systems. 
 
Water allocation specifications are granted using a host terms such as:  
  A nominal volume 
  A volumetric limit  
  A maximum rate that the water 
may be taken at   A location which identifies the 
zone from which water can be 
taken 
  A purpose for the use of the 
water taken under the 
allocation; and 
  A passing flow condition
 
The basic approach is for water users to buy water from the ‘market’, not the water 
plans managed by government. Property specific land and water plans then need to 
be drawn up before the water is used. These plans can also be used to help reduce 
sediment runoff and enhance water quality through best practice irrigation techniques 
and retaining riparian vegetation. Success for this segment of the management plan is 
yet to be documented and is ‘soft’ law at best.  
 
Water transactions proceed via certain restrictions. State authority must approve 
transactions once certain conditions are met and transactions can be rejected if it is 
judged there is a negative externality caused by the trade (example, salinity or water 
quality problems). Current embargoes and caps in certain over-allocated basins 
necessitate that new diversions must be met through the water trading system.  
 
Robinson and Ryan
29 list a number of legal, scientific difficulties this type of market 
has yet to deal with: 
 
  (1) the science used has a significant degree of uncertainty due, in part, to the 
variability of Australia’s climate. This creates problems in over-allocated systems 
where scientific information is required to justify a reduction in water entitlements. 
The reductions in allocations may be challenged in court and lead to expensive and 
lengthy scientific debate. Scientific uncertainty can also be a problem in under-
allocated systems as there is a temptation to sell or auction off the remaining water 
allocations, leaving little scope for revising the Environmental Flow Objectives 
upward in the light of future science. Once property rights are granted in water they 
are difficult and expensive to ‘claw back’, requiring revisions of water resource 
plans, which are to be reviewed every 10 years.  
  (2) the Act provides for Environmental Flow Objectives for “the achievement 
of ecological outcomes”, broadly defined as “a consequence for an ecosystem in its 
component parts specified for aquifers, drainage basins, catchments, subcatchments 
and watercourses”. The Water Resources (Boyne River Basin) Plan 2000 includes 
the following ecological outcome “River flows are to be managed … to allow for an 
increase in the frequency and duration of marine conditions in the estuarine reach 
downstream of Awoonga Dam leading to a shift towards plant species that tolerate 
the increase”. This however is arguably a negative outcome and there is some 
evidence that limits have been set beyond the Environmental Flow Objectives.  
  (3) the decision whether or not to trade in entitlements is largely an economic 
question for the water user. Queensland currently has 6 water basins out of a possible 
23 trading water. Robinson remarks that there may be reluctance to trade because 
revenue received from the sale would not offset the risk of having insufficient water 
if rainfall was low or if the seller changed their crops in the future.  
 
                                                 
29 Robinson R and Ryan S, A Review of Economic Instruments for Environmental Management in 
Queensland, CRC for Coastal Zone, Estuary and Waterway Management, June 2002 The Council of Australian Governments (COAG) launched the National Water 
Initiative (NWI) in 2004 aimed at pursuing greater compatibility and the adoption of 
best-practice approaches to water management nationally in a range of areas. It is 
hoped the NWI will result in, amongst other matters:  
 
  expansion of permanent trade in water bringing about more profitable use of 
water and more cost effective and flexible recovery of water to achieve 
environmental outcomes;   
  more confidence for those investing in the water industry due to more secure 
water access entitlements, better and more compatible registry arrangements, 
better monitoring, reporting and accounting of water use, and improved 
public access to information;  
  more sophisticated, transparent and comprehensive water planning that deals 
with key issues such as the major interception of water, the interaction 
between surface and groundwater systems, and the provision of water to meet 
specific environmental outcomes;  
  a commitment to addressing over-allocated systems as quickly as possible, in 
consultation with affected stakeholders, addressing significant adjustment 
issues where appropriate; and  
  better and more efficient management of water in urban environments, for 
example through the increased use of recycled water and stormwater. 
 
COAG have acknowledged that good progress is being made in water reform but a 
number of issues need to be addressed to speed up the process: 1) uncertainty over 
the long-term access to water is still hampering investments in higher valued and 
more efficient production systems; 2) current water market arrangements are 
preventing markets from reaching their full potential; and 3) significant concerns 
with securing environmental flows and adaptive management systems to ensure the 
health of riverine systems.  
 
A compensatable tradeable water property rights system has also been established 
but only when certain allocations are changed after certain statutory reviews over 
long periods of time. That is, it is not very comprehensive or amenable to a system 
based on the whims of nature. This means the range of possible changes to volume 
and entitlement is open to risk and inefficiencies. Other institutional elements are 
also yet to emerge such as technologies to measure precise water quantities and 
appropriate clearing houses or brokers to facilitate trading.  
 
The Productivity Commission released a discussion document in June 2006 
researching ways to assist Australian governments meet their commitments under the 
NWI in relation to water markets and trading. Several of the main findings include:
30
  Markets are already making a significant contribution to increasing rural 
water-use efficiency. But further reform is needed to ensure that water 
continually moves to its highest value uses (including environmental uses). 
  Market mechanisms to address environmental externalities need to be 
targeted to location and scale — no ‘one size’ fits all. Poorly designed 
programs can impose high costs that may outweigh potential gains. 
                                                 
30 Productivity Commission, Rural Water Use and the Environment: The Role of Market Mechanisms, 
Discussion Draft, Melbourne, June 2006   Appropriate arrangements for environmental managers should be established 
as soon as is practical based on a comprehensive review of different 
institutional structures. They need clearly defined objectives, good 
coordination processes and adequate resources. They need to enter markets to 
source water and to access the full range of water and water-related products 
on the same terms and conditions as other market participants. 
  The Living Murray Initiative could be implemented more effectively if 
current efforts to source water ‘permanently’ are supplemented with 
additional water products (such as seasonal allocations, leases and options 
contracts). Appropriate institutional arrangements should be put in place to 
establish an agency specifically charged with purchasing a portfolio of water 
products to suit the needs of environmental management in the River Murray. 
  Using administrative arrangements to allocate water for environmental 
purposes conceals the opportunity cost of meeting environmental targets. 
Market mechanisms are usually a more efficient means of re-allocating 
resources.  
  Climate change, farm dams, vegetation and land-use changes, groundwater 
extraction, and changes to irrigation water management, have the potential to 
reduce stream flows substantially. In the Murray–Darling Basin, such 
reductions undermine efforts to achieve environmental goals and can affect 
the reliability of existing entitlements. Priority should be given to refining 
and clarifying existing property rights, undertaking further research on water 
systems and improving water accounting. 
  There are opportunities to improve entitlement regimes through unbundling 
of water entitlements and water-use approvals, and facilitating efficient 
intertemporal water-use decisions. Separating delivery entitlements from 
water entitlements may also be beneficial where there is congestion in water 
delivery. 
  A number of impediments to water trade reduce economic efficiency and 
should be removed. In particular, governments should: 
–  enable other participants to trade in water markets 
–  open up interdistrict water entitlement trade, and remove exit fees. 
 
The above section outlines the contribution trading can have assisting rural water-use 
efficiency but water market failures and indeed inappropriate trading can effect third 
parties concerning: volumetric reliability, delivery reliability and water quality. It 
will be necessary for policy makers to determine whether these impacts should be 
prevented and internalise the impacts with the water traders. Various options exist 
such as restricting trade to smaller areas to limit third part effects; compensating third 
parties; using fees to compensate third parties, using actions to mitigate impacts; and 
the use of exchange rates to adjust traded entitlements.
31  
   
Secure water supply and risk management 
 
As water rights are formed under state regulation, there may be claims for 
compensation under state law. In 2000, the Federal Minister for Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Forestry, Warren Truss MP, thought it was simply down to morals:  
                                                 
31 See Etchells T et al, Overcoming third party effects from water trading in the Murray-Darling 
Basin, Water Policy 8 (2006) 69-80.  
“I have no hesitation in supporting the view that any landholder whose rights are 
restricted or removed has a clear moral right to compensation, even if some of the 
states might argue they don’t have a legal obligation.”
32
 
Moral jurisdiction in this case would however only apply to states and territories and 
not the Federal Government. 
 
Long-term specification of property rights to water of 10 or more years is provided 
for but uncertainties regarding climatic conditions, future expansion of industry, 
environmental requirements and other resource functions, can all place differing risks 
on water entitlements and either add or detract value from water.  
 
“Assigning even a notional reliability factor to water entitlements is a tentative step 
forward in the specification of property rights to water.”
33 Allowing transferability 
on top of this the market then at least has some idea of the status of what is being 
traded; the extreme being full property rights. For a perfect market though, fully 
specified property rights would be necessary and provide confidence to farmers and 
irrigators that a water entitlement is a stable quantity. Is this a contradiction in arid 
Australia? “[C]ertainty is unattainable when set against the inherent variability of 
water supply.”
34 It is important to note that compensation is only payable in 
Queensland if the Water Resource Plan is amended during its 10 year life and if the 
amendment results in a reduction of the value of a water allocation. 
 
A fundamental criterion when allocating water to prospective users is to deal with 
water quality and water flows for the environment first and allocate what’s left. 
Water Quality Objectives and Water Flow Objectives are instrumental to this task – 
where they have been established. This task is easier when supply and quality is not 
much of a problem but has presented problems for over-allocated areas such as the 
Murray-Darling Basin.  
 
So what is guaranteed? An example is a farmer having a nominal 1,000 ML 
allocation for 85 out of 100 years. Certain sectors of the economy such as cotton 
growers are very competent with these terms and implement good risk management 
systems. The volume allocated can be traded, leased and so forth depending on what 
owners have decided for their water. More and more products are emerging to 
manage water quantity risk such as: sell and buy options, futures markets, leasing, 
temporary and permanent trading instruments, insurance, and weather derivatives.  
 
Water continues to be vested in the state. Entities purchase a right to a volume and 
reliability over time to use that water at a particular place. The ‘right’ is a right to 
access a share of a proportion of water available. In the end, this is an actual volume, 
but not referred to as a specific volume; it is a ‘right to access’. That access is 
nominal and determined annually. For example, one year a farmer may get 50% of 
the annual allocation, the next year might be 90%.  
 
                                                 
32 Australian Financial Review, “Federal attack on compo gets rise from States,” 2 March 2000 at 6.  
33 Pigram J, “Property Rights and Water Markets in Australia: An Evolutionary Process Toward 
Institutional Reform”, April 1993, Water Resources Research, Vol 29, No 4, at 1316. 
34 Ibid. One of the ways to decrease proprietary risk is by purchasing ‘high priority’ water. 
For example, mines often purchase water physically – say a 20 year allocation of a 
certain volume from a utility; direct from a dam (example, Sunwater in Queensland). 
The utility receives elevated prices and bears some risk of being in a position to 
ensure a supply of water. If there was a severe drought the farmers downstream 
would have their taps turned off before the mines as the mines have purchased high 
priority water, against medium priority for agriculture. Supply risks are also borne by 
the mine depending on the nature of the contract which will no doubt be using “Act 
of God” clauses. These groups generally are highly knowledgeable about the 
reliability of water variability and negotiate contracts accordingly.  
 
Drinking water and mining in Australia are typically high priority water. This means 
the water is more secured and attracts higher relative fees and charges (but it is 
important to point out water pricing does not properly consider externalities or 
scarcity). There still remains environmental and commercial risks with a system that 
reviews in 10 year brackets and then only compensates on changes to that 10 year 
allocation. It is incumbent for water owners to finance supply security and by 
adequately using insurance or financial risk tools critical to a water rights system 
being a complete, fully valued asset.  
 
Many advocate the repurchase of water rights from irrigators where there is a need to 
meet environmental objectives. Salinity and water related problems of land and water 
management constitute one of the biggest environmental problems facing Australia. 
Economic costs associated with salinity may be as much as $350 million per year 
when forgone opportunities in agriculture are taken into account. Environmental 
flows are only done every 10 years so a lot of work needs to go into getting this right. 
The Murray Basins show that water is over-allocated and other measures such as buy 
backs are requiring consideration especially with the onset of climate change 
adjustments. Quiggin believes that water policy is being radically constrained by the 
refusal of most governments to accept the need to repurchase water rights from 
irrigators where there is a need to meet environmental objectives.
35 It is clear 
environmental contingency allocations will need to become a more significant part of 
water trade policy in the future based on a compromise between these competing 
interests.  
 
The legislative framework that has developed over the past six years has made it 
possible for water users to buy water to expand their operations and sell any they do 
not need. Secure entitlements to water by governments is prescribed, but supply 
variability is strenuously defended. Some players in the market, such as irrigators, 
see this as not being fully conducive to the market system. Others say this is what 
nature decrees and should be reflected in supply being assured by agencies. This 
opens the opportunity for separate financial instruments to be used more to mitigate 
financial risk such as insurance, futures or other tradeable instruments that embody 
concepts like ‘exchange rates’.  
 
                                                 
35 Quiggin J, Submission to the Productivity Commission research study, Rural Water Use and the 
Environment: The Role of Market Mechanisms, 17 March 2006. The threat of water quality and poorly defined  
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It is widely recognised that diffuse water pollution now accounts for a significant 
proportion of the pollutant load in Australian waterways. This section of the paper 
reviews the status of diffuse water pollution highlighting efforts by scientists, 
government agencies and others to develop water pollution law and policy in the face 
of very high uncertainty and financial constraints.  
 
In the past, the legal system has forced a preponderance of resources into the control 
of point-source pollution. However, a large proportion of the contaminated load to 
surface and ground waters comes from the land around these waters (example, farms 
and city streets), rather than specific point sources.
36 Growing scientific data showing 
a significant proportion of pollution coming from diffuse sources, changes in risk 
assessment paradigms and an increased catchment focus is driving very different 
responses from water managers than the status quo.  
 
Background and nature of diffuse water pollution 
 
Environmental protection law typically provides a long and broad definition of water 
pollution which would include diffuse sources but often does not provide specific 
mention of diffuse water pollution. Basically, any matter going into water is 
pollution. Diffuse water pollution occurs from discharges without a single point of 
origin. These discharges can be polluted surface runoff waters flowing into 
waterways (mainly during wet weather), seepage from groundwater or small 
discharges from a large number of sources resulting in cumulative impacts (example, 
discharges from vessels). Diffuse sources are difficult to deal with through regulatory 
approaches because they cannot be readily identified and measured.
37 Not only is the 
distinction between point and diffuse pollution often blurred, there are ‘endemic 
problems for environmental law about the identification of sources of pollution, and 
the identification of the standards appropriate for the environment into which these 
polluting materials are released.’
38  
 
Sources of diffuse-source pollution  
 
Sources of diffuse water pollution include agricultural runoff, erosion, industrial 
discharge, urban stormwater, and disturbed lands such as mines and quarries. The 
United States Environmental Protection Agency provides a comprehensive 
description of diffuse water pollution: 
 
‘Nonpoint source pollution, unlike pollution from industrial and sewage treatment 
plants, comes from many diffuse sources. [Diffuse water pollution] is caused by 
                                                 
36 Thornton J, Rast W, Holland M, Jolankai G, and Ryding S (1999), Assessment and Control of 
Nonpoint source Pollution of Aquatic Ecosystems, UNESCO, p. 2.  
37 Adapted from Fisher D, Water Law, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2000; Bates G and Lipman 
Z, Corporate Liability for Pollution, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1998; and Thornton J, Rast 
W, Holland M, Jolankai G, and Ryding S (1999), Assessment and Control of Nonpoint source 
Pollution of Aquatic Ecosystems, UNESCO. 
38 Fisher D, Water Law, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2000, p. 266. rainfall or snowmelt moving over and through the ground. As the runoff moves after 
rainfall, it picks up and carries away natural and human-made pollutants, finally 
depositing them into lakes, rivers, wetlands, coastal waters, and even our 
underground sources of drinking water. These pollutants include:  
  Excess fertilizers, herbicides, and insecticides from agricultural lands and 
residential areas  
  Oil, grease, and toxic chemicals from urban runoff and energy production  
  Sediment from improperly managed construction sites, crop and forest lands, 
and eroding stream banks  
  Salt from irrigation practices and acid drainage from abandoned mines  
  Bacteria and nutrients from livestock, pet wastes, and faulty septic systems.’
39 
 
Why has diffuse pollution become a problem? 
 
Several significant events over the past decade have influenced the focus in Australia 
on the management of diffuse source water pollution. These include: the Wallis Lake 
oyster pollution incident; the Sydney Water Crisis; the Health Rivers Commission 
Inquiry into the Hawkesbury-Nepean; the South East Queensland Water Quality 
Management Strategy, Great Barrier Reef Water Quality Protection Plan, ongoing 
community and government concern about algal blooms and other perceived water 
quantity and quality problems. It is a widespread problem: ‘there is little 
disagreement that nonpoint source pollution is a major cause of water quality 
degradation on a global scale.’
40 The pressures outlined above have resulted in blue-
green algal blooms and excessive plant growth, eroded river banks, impacts to 
human health, reduced river flows for aquatic ecosystems, and decreased populations 
of fish and other in-stream species in the catchment. 
  
All Australian governments have underway a number of programs to address diffuse 
water pollution issues, including stormwater management, sewer overflows and 
irrigation area licensing, state forestry licensing and a range of cleaner production, 
education and community development initiatives. State government environmental 
authorities have recourse to licensing requirements, ecological provisions stipulated 
in laws and operational policies, regulation through notices, criminal law, and 
environmental audits. Strikingly, virtually all diffuse sources can escape these tools. 
There are some tools and programs being applied to diffuse water pollution directly 
(eg. acid sulfate soils) or indirectly via stormwater management or by a planning 
framework in which diffuse water pollution is considered but this application can be 
classified as relatively soft and ineffectual.  
 
While knowledge of diffuse water pollution has greatly increased, it still hasn’t 
reached the critical level needed to overcome the current focus on point source 
pollution. The added difficulty of assessing risks to formulate policy has resulted in 
weak institutional responses. Thorton et al make note of three predominant factors 
underlying the problem of diffuse-source pollution: (1) lack of basic knowledge and 
understanding of the extent of diffuse-source pollution, (2) lack of knowledge and 
experience regarding the multidisciplinary and multi-institutional approach necessary 
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40 Thornton J, Rast W, Holland M, Jolankai G, and Ryding S (1999), Assessment and Control of 
Nonpoint source Pollution of Aquatic Ecosystems, UNESCO, p. 3. to solve diffuse-source pollution, and (3) that diffuse-source pollution closely links 




Do the courts recognise diffuse pollution?  
 
As discussed above, while common law recognises possession and ownership as 
superior, it struggles to recognise moving mediums such as air, water and 
biodiversity. This has shown to be inadequate to deal with the interconnectedness of 
modern life and unable to deal with common property resources such as water.
42 This 
traditional view has eventually failed to apply to water protection and a number of 
statutory measures have been instigated, although directed at point sources as 
discussed.  
 
Common law has gone to some lengths to allow people sovereignty over their land, 
to chose what they do with and on it, but also to protect the rights of others that the 
former may interfere with.
 43 Most diffuse water pollution conflicts are incompatible 
with the adversarial legal system that appreciates clearly defined problems between 
parties that are easily identified. The multiplicity of diffuse sources makes this a 
fraught process asking for much greater input and clarity from processes of science 
and the processes of law. Further, identifying and measuring the impacts of pollution 
can be very difficult; especially diffuse pollution and impact comparisons with point 
sources. The basic concept to calculate harm is that: if a person’s water rights are 
interfered with in respect to quality or quantity then retribution can be sought. As the 
following discussion reveals, this concept has played an important role in 
contemporary environmental law and has expanded into fields such as product 
liability; especially when the product (example, oysters) comes from the 
environment. The threat of this occurring on a more frequent level is increasing as 
reports on diffuse pollution worsen (for example, see Reef Water Quality Protection 
Plan, South East Queensland Healthy Waterways Water Quality Management 
Strategy).  
 
Vanson v Forestry Commission 
 
In Van Son v Forestry Commission
44 Cohen J held the Forestry Commission liable to 
a downstream landowner for siltation caused by logging operations which 
detrimentally affected the quality of the water lawfully used by the plaintiff for 
domestic purposes.
45 The licence conditions provided by the EPA were found to be 
adequate for aquatic life but were not good enough for Van Son’s domestic purposes. 
Thus, common law rights survived administrative license rights determined by a 
government agency. Justice Cohen found that riparian owners had retained their 
residual common law right to water for domestic purposes that was not significantly 
                                                 
41 Thornton J, Rast W, Holland M, Jolankai G, and Ryding S (1999), Assessment and Control of 
Nonpoint source Pollution of Aquatic Ecosystems, UNESCO, p. 2.  
42 Ramsay R and Rowe G, Environmental Law and Policy in Australia, Butterworths, Sydney, 1995, 
at 123.  
43 Fisher D, Water Law, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 2000, p. 116. 
44 (1995) 86 LGERA 108. 
45 Bates G and Lipman Z, Corporate Liability for Pollution, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1998, 
G. & Lipman, Z (1998) Corporate Liability for Pollution, LBC Information Services, p116. altered in terms of its character or quality, despite the enactment of the Water Act 
1912 and the Water Administration Act 1986.
46
 
Common law rights to water are now modified by statutes, such that all significant 
abstractions of water are controlled under licence from the Crown.
47 Riparian land 
owners continue to have a property right to use water in NSW for example, however 
this is restricted to the rights of occupiers of riparian land as defined in s.7 of the 
Water Act. The right to take and use water is now covered by the Water Act, but 
water quality is still protected under the common law doctrine. 
 
Although not used in this case, environmental nuisance is another legal tool that may 
be increasingly used during diffuse water pollution disputes. Nuisance, can occur 
when an emission can interfere with a person’s enjoyment of the environment or an 
environmental value caused by noise, dust, fumes, smoke, odour or light; or an 
unhealthy, offensive or unsightly condition because of pollution or contamination; or 
some other prescribed manner.
48     
 
In time, it is likely there will be more of these type of cases going to trial. A gap has 
emerged between the pace of progress and development and the law used to control 
it. Emerging scientific data is becoming very robust at identifying the number of 
dischargers (industry, water treatment plants, agriculture, runoff from communities) 
that create an environmental problem and infringe upon a persons rights. Better 
science will continue to test this gap. The outcome for the governments is the need to 
research appropriate institutional mechanisms to effectively handle multi-agency 
concerns – tools that can manage both development and environmental protection 
together. 
 
Can a form of trading or property right be used? 
 
Having some sort of emissions trading or offsets is increasingly being proposed as 
one means to improve management of diffuse pollution. The trading concept is being 
used and tested widely around the world,
49 particularly with point sources but is yet 
to be seriously progressed anywhere with diffuse sources.
 50 However research, 
enthusiasm and sheer necessity is driving consideration of applying economic 
measures to diffuse pollution.  
 
The concept of using trading or offsets to manage development pressures and 
environmental impacts is being considered widely across Australia. The basic idea of 
offset trading is that if a source wishes to either create new pollutant loads or 
                                                 
46 Farrier, D., Lyster, R. & Pearson (1999) Chapter 2 - Basic Concepts in Environmental Law, The 
Environmental Law Handbook, Redfern Legal Centre Publishing, p. 35. 
47 Bates, op.cit, p.154. 
48 Bates G and Lipman Z, Corporate Liability for Pollution, LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1998, 
p. 16. 
49 See US EPA Water Quality Trading Policy  
http://www.epa.gov/owow/watershed/trading/tradingpolicy.html ; O’Sullivan D, ‘Creating Markets 
for Nutrients and Other Water Pollutants’, Coast to Coast 2002 Source to Sea, Australia’s National 
Coastal Conference, Tweed Heads, 4-8 November 2002. 
50 See National Agricultural Library USA  http://www.nal.usda.gov/wqic/trading.shtml ; US EPA 
non-point source program http://www.epa.gov/nps/; National Action Plan for Salinity and Water 
Quality http://www.napswq.gov.au/   increase existing loads it must first offset its increase by reductions in loadings 
elsewhere. Examples include: developers of a new golf course might be required to 
fund best management practices in nearby agricultural areas in addition to on-site 
best management practices; or a new housing development might only be approved 
if, as part of the development, convert septic tanks in an existing development to an 
improved sewered system.  
 
Trading or offset programs can be established so that development has no net 
environmental impacts, or so that development leads to net environmental 
improvements. It is possible to require an offset ratio greater than one, so that 
sources have to more than offset their planned increase in loadings. This can be used 
to achieve additional environmental improvements and to hedge against any 
uncertainties regarding water quality impacts. 
 
Offset contracts can be implemented via bilateral negotiations between stakeholders 
(that is, where developers directly contract with owners of potential mitigation sites), 
or through privately or publicly owned offset banks. An offset bank is not a bank in 
the usual sense. Rather it involves the completion of one or more projects in which 
environmental remediation works are undertaken. By completing these works, offset 
banks earn “credits” which can then be sold to developers who are creating net-
impacts on environmental quality. 
 
In 2001, there were estimated to be over 200 operational wetland mitigation banks in 
the USA, and over 100 awaiting regulatory approval. The advantage of either setting 
up a private or a government program to oversee implementation of offsets is that it 
would greatly reduce the transaction costs of using offsets. It has been found that 
increasing transaction costs will reduce the propensity of sources to use incentive 
programs such as offset banking. 
 
Generally, a scheme that provides and institutes a requirement for incremental 
nutrient impacts associated with new developments to be offset could be placed 
under planning and pollution control statutes. Provisions would stipulate new 
developments or industries that would need to seek pollution credits for their scheme 
if their emissions were expected to exceed a nominated threshold. A scheme could 
also be applied in this way to areas where more stringent water quality goals are to 
be instituted and requires a number of sources to contribute to an overall emissions 
reduction.  
 
Offset schemes such as this have been developed internationally and trialled on the 
Hawkesbury-Nepean in NSW and Busselton in Western Australia. In addition, offset 
banking is proposed under new native vegetation clearing legislation in both NSW 
and Victoria, while Melbourne Water has recently announced a stormwater quality 
offset scheme. Queensland is currently investigating environmental offsets under a 
range of scenarios.  
 
Rolfe and Windle recently completed a major study on the use of these instruments 
for diffuse sources in the Lower Fitzroy in Queensland. Perhaps the single biggest 
conclusion of this work was that there is plenty of opportunity to trade between diffuse agriculture sources in the region but the imposition of a cap on this specific 
group is politically and practically unrealistic.
51   
 
Many issues need to be researched:  
 
  What part of catchments should be targeted? 
  What discharges and sources should be covered to elicit the most feasible 
offsets?    
  How do we ensure ‘environmental equivalence’ or ‘like-for-like’ offsets?  
  Identifying the form of pollutant discharged - the tradeable instrument, and 




With increasing pressure on water resource management in Australia, the use of 
property rights as a management tool is increasingly being demanded. Current policy 
and institutional arrangements stem from water scarcity and common law approaches 
to water quality and quantity conflict resolution. Centuries ago, the tragedy of the 
commons was understood as an environmental outcome that results from an 
inadequate specification of property rights to natural resources. This adage is as true 
today with water resource management continuing to suffer in some cases from 
poorly defining rights to water quantity but more so to water quality. This paper 
submits this posses a major constraint to water policy development.  
 
The paper discussed the emergence of water property rights in Australia and where 
ambiguity or policy and institutional gaps remain obstacles to meeting the full 
potential of a market-based approach for water management. How clear can water 
rights be under a system that requires necessary attenuation during dry times? Is 
there a right to a certain degree of water quality and how does this relate to a lack of 
rights on water pollution? There is no doubt greater clarity is required on these issues 
and water rights and management of diffuse pollution could be considerably 
improved by a tradeable permit or offset system. 
 
To sum, designing tradeable permit systems for water comes with its challenges and 
many competitive characteristics of a market are currently not present in the market 
for water and pollution entitlements. If authorities carefully design the market, 
setting the rules and facilitating low cost exchange, some of these challenges could 
be mitigated. 
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